Board-level activism defence strategy against a hypothetical campaign ahead of the 2027 AGM.
A board facing a plausible activist campaign has to decide what to concede before it is asked. The memo modelled a ShareAction campaign against Repsol ahead of the 2027 AGM and asked what the board should do now.
Activist coalition scenarios were modelled through Article 243 LSC proportional representation, which is the specific Spanish mechanism that determines how many board seats a coalition of a given size can actually claim. That is the constraint that decides whether a campaign is worth defending against at all.
The shareholder base was segmented and votes projected across Norges Bank, Amundi, BlackRock and Vanguard, with ISS and Glass Lewis positioning modelled separately because the proxy advisers move a bloc of smaller holders independently.
A three-pillar defence framework with a triangulation mechanism for testing whether the vote projection held under different assumptions about the undecided register. Five original analytical contributions, graded 81 out of 100.
The memo was later reviewed in person by Cas Sydorowitz, Global CEO of Georgeson. That conversation surfaced an error in my retail ownership data and led to a corrected register analysis.
That is the most useful thing that happened to this piece of work. A vote projection is only as good as the register underneath it, and I had the retail segment wrong.